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THE ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT IN OHIO
A couple contemplating marriage can define their respectiveproperty rights and
interests in an antenuptial contract. The Ohio courts, however, have read such
contracts restrictively and have applied rules mechamcally to reach unpredictable
results. The author suggests that the Ohio courts adopt an approach that corre-
sponds more closely to the modern understanding 0/the marriage relationshoa and
that they draw on trends in otherjurisdictions to make the antenuptial contract a
useful and effective planning tool
AN ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT' is a contract "between a
man and a woman before marriage, but in contemplation and
generally in consideration of marriage whereby the property
rights and interests of either the prospective husband, or wife, or
both of them, are determined, or where property is secured to ei-
ther or both of them."2 Antenuptial contracts are most useful to,
and are most often used by, a prospective spouse who has been
married previously and has children from the prior marriage.3
Often, the purpose of the contract is to ensure that the contracting
party's estate will pass to his heirs from the first marriage, undi-
minished by the share the surviving spouse of the second marriage
is entitled to take at law.4
The Ohio Supreme Court early declared antenuptial contracts
to be beneficial and within public policy.' At its first opportunity
to pass on the validity of antenuptial contracts, the court stated
that "such contracts are in favor of marriage and tend to promote
domestic happiness by removing one of the frequent causes of
family disputes-contentions about property, especially al-
lowances to the wife."6 Antenuptial contracts have been well-re-
ceived in most other jurisdictions as well; in fact, one is hard-
pressed to find a decision involving antenuptial contracts that
does not contain a similar statement of praise.7
1. Also known as a prenuptial or marriage settlement contract.
2. Subrin, Some PracticalAspects ofAntenuptialAgreements Under the Laws o/Ohio,
18 U. CIN. L. REv. 53, 53 (1949) (emphasis deleted).
3. See Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972).
4. Subrin, supra note 2, at 54. For a discussion of the rights of the surviving spouse
in Ohio, see notes 50-54 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
6. Id. at 649.
7. Gamble, supra note 3, at 692 n.2.
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In light of the fanfare with which the antenuptial contract was
recognized in Ohio, one might expect considerable precedent on
such contracts. However, little has materialized. Three reasons
have been suggested to account for the paucity of cases.' Perhaps
prospective spouses do not know about the instrument or choose
not to use it.9 Perhaps antenuptial contracts are widely used, but
their validity is seldom litigated. But it is most likely that the
instrument is not the subject of litigation because the practitioner
chooses not to employ it. Why? The answer is that the courts in
Ohio have viewed such contracts restrictively,1" have applied rules
of construction mechanically,'1 and have decided cases involving
such contracts unpredictably.' 2 One writer has analogized the
"perils" of drafting and validating an antenuptial contract in Ohio
to traveling down a "legal highway" scattered with "pitfalls" and
"dead-end street[s]."' 3
The analysis employed by the courts of Ohio is not unique; the
courts of other jurisdictions approach antenuptial contracts in the
same manner.'4  They balance sub silentio the parties' freedom to
contract15 with the state's interest in preserving the marital rela-
tion.16 In Ohio this balancing has led courts to refuse to enforce
8. Id. at 692-93.
9. This may be attributable, in part, to a lack of premarital counseling: "With the
exception of some people who have been married previously, almost all couples marry
without the help of any legal. . . counseling." King & Firestone, Antenuptial Contract:.A
Useful41ternatve, 4 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 249, 257 (1975).
10. This restrictive view manifests itself when the courts imply a constructive condi-
tion in antenuptial contracts (under the guise of construing the actual terms of the instru-
ment) and make the validity of the contract dependent upon the continued existence of the
marital relation. See notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
11. The courts' mechanistic approach is demonstrated by those opinions which rest
ostensibly on the intent of the parties as articulated in the contract where the courts in fact
"found" intent without supporting its conclusion with the terms of the antenuptial agree-
ment. See notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
12. Ohio's law on antenuptial contracts is unpredictable because the courts utilize
rules that are based on intent, but the decisions reveal no clue as to what language in the
contracts triggers the holdings. See notes 114:51 infra and accompanying text.
13. Subrin, supra note 2, at 53.
14. See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950).
15. Freedom to contract is protected under the Ohio Constitution: "All men are, by
nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and property, acquiring, possessing, and protecting prop-
erty, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety." OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 1. The right
to contract is a derivative property right. City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co.,
67 Ohio St. 197, 219, 65 N.E. 885, 890 (1902). See also In re Staube, 91 Ohio St. 135, 139,
110 N.E. 250, 251 (1914).
16. The state recognizes marriage as a favored legal status. See Waymire v. Jetmore,
22 Ohio St. 271 (1872).
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antenuptial contracts in favor of a spouse who fails to meet his
marital obligations1 7 or to enforce antenuptial contracts which
might undermine the stability of the marital relation.I" A reading
of these decisions suggests that judges tip the balance prior to the
hearing on any particular case in favor of the state's interest in
stable marriage relationships.
Though this approach may have reflected popular sentiment
toward marriage in years past, such an approach is anachronistic
today. Fundamental changes in the perception of marriage and
marital roles indicate that it is time for Ohio to review its law
regarding antenuptial contracts. The traditional view of the une-
qual status of men and women both in society and in the marriage
relationship 9 is giving way to egalitarian concept.20 The fabric
of our society is changing as more people divorce each year2' and
Marriage is a civil contract, but it is sul generis and differs from all other
contracts. It is an agreement that creates a social status. The legal incidents of
that status and the rights and obligations flowing from it are imposed by society
independently of the will of the parties. Although mutual consent creates the
status, mutual consent cannot dissolve it. Only death or divorce will sever the tie.
1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 8, at 8-3 (rev.
ed. 1961). See also Note, Unander v. Unander, Recognition of the Alimony Provision in
Antenuptial Contracts, 10 WILLAME-rE L.J. 117, 117 n.2 (1973).
The state is said to have a vital interest in marriage as the "foundation of our civilized
structure." See J. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 341, at 722-24 (2d rev. ed.
1974); 2 A. LINDEY, supra, § 90, at 90-27; Comment, Husband and Wtfe-Antenuptial Con-
tracts, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1133, 1135 (1943). This interest is so great that writers have
observed the courts' view of marriage as a tripartite relationship between the state and the
husband and wife. 2 A. LINDEY, supra, § 8, at 8-4; Flieschnmann, Marriage by Contract:
Defining the Terms of Relationshifp, 8 FAM. L.Q. 27 (1974); Note, Marriage, Contracts, and
Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REv. 473 (1941).
17. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio App. 399 (Cuy. County 1919) (wife
awarded alimony in divorce proceeding despite provision in antenuptial contract depriving
her of any interest in her husband's property if they separated because his neglect of her
was so gross as to constitute a breach of contract on his part).
18. See, e.g., Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d 813 (Cuy. County 1946)
(voiding an antenuptial contract provision permitting wife to maintain an action against
her husband for injuries suffered in an automobile accident prior to their marriage).
19. This conception of the status of the male vis-a-vis the female is usually couched in
terms of the male's physical and intellectual superiority over the weak, submissive, and
intellectually inferior female.
20. Representative of this trend is the move to ratify the proposed twenty-seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution. The amendment provides: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex." U.S. CONST. proposed amend. XXVII, § 1. Ohio reacted to this trend
in 1974 and repealed OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (repealed) (Page 1974), which pro-
vided that the "husband is the head of the household."
21. The national divorce rate increased steadily from 2.2 per 1000 in 1960 to 4.6 per
1000 in 1974. In Ohio the rate jumped from 2.4 per 1000 in 1960 to 4.6 per 1000 in 1974.
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fewer people choose to marry.2' Furthermore, more antenuptial
contracts are being written and litigated each year 23 and the par-
ties are successfully enforcing agreements which reorder aspects of
their relationship in ways not previously cognizable.z4
Today the antenuptial contract can be beneficial both to the
contracting parties and to society not only by serving to promote
marriage and marriage stability 5 but also by curbing litigation of
divorce decrees.26 Though antenuptial contracts may indeed be
useful, they will not be used unless the Ohio courts clarify the law
surrounding them.27 The objective of this Note is to explicate the
Ohio law regarding the antenuptial contract, to suggest refine-
ments in the courts' analysis, and to explore a variety of enforce-
ment techniques.
I. THE LAW OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
4. Background
1. History
At early common law a woman's legal identity merged with
her husband's upon marriage. 28 A wife had no independent legal
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES table no.
103, at 71 (97th ed. 1976).
22. The national marriage rate climbed from 8.5 per 1000 in 1960 to 11 per 1000 in
1972 and then fell steadily to 10 per 1000 in 1975. Id. table no. 97, at 68 (97th ed. 1976).
23. Gamble, supra note 3, at 694; King & Firestone, supra note 9, at 257.
24. See, ag., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
25. See note 85 infra.
26. "One out of every three marriages results in divorce. Of those divorce decrees
appealed, most are challenged on the basis of the alimony award, the property division, or
the child custody determination. It is the economics of divorce which most often prove
unacceptable." Note, The Economics of Divorce:Alimony andPropertyAwards, 43 U. CIN.
L. REv. 133, 135 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Public Policy, The Courts, and
Antenuptial.Agreements Specifying Alimony, 23 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 113 (1970):
[A] study has shown a direct positive correlation between an ex-husband's
favorable attitude toward his alimony payments and the continuity of such pay-
ments. A man who thinks an alimony award is too high is more likely to default
on his payments than one who feels that he is paying a just amount. Common
sense suggests that a man who has contracted for an alimony award in an ante-
nuptial agreement would usually feel the award justified.
.d. at 132 (footnotes omitted).
At present, antenuptial contracts "contemplating" a future divorce are struck down by
most courts as contrary to public policy. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
27. The lawyer, schooled to be careful and conservative in his judgment, is likely to
hesitate recommending the use of so uncertain a tool as the antenuptial contract. See
notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
28. The basis for this concept was twofold. Until the Industrial Revolution the
medieval western family was the basic economic and social unit in a predomi-
nantly agrarian society. Males worked the land while females managed the inter-
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right to own or dispose of property, or to enter into a contract.29
Accordingly, antenuptial contracts were unenforceable at com-
mon law. Because dower was regarded as an inchoate right
which could not be barred before it accrued,3" settlements or con-
veyances executed prior to marriage aimed at divesting the wife's
right to dower were voided by the courts.31
To give effect to their desires the parties executed a jointure.
A jointure was a trust device whereby the husband settled to a
trustee a remainder interest in his lands to the use of his intended
wife for life, in exchange for a relinquishment of his intended
wife's dower interest.32  Such transfers were fully enforced by eq-
uity courts.33 Thus, the parties could accomplish through equity
that which they could not at law.
As time passed, legal rights were gradually extended to the
wife. 34  Finally, through passage of the Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts the unity fiction was dispelled, allowing women to own
and dispose of property and to make contracts.
The first recognition of the validity of an antenuptial contract
in Ohio was in the mid-nineteenth century decision of Stilley v.
nal affairs of the household. The father was the dominant figure in the family's
social relations, while the role of the mother was confined solely to domestic du-
ties. Moreover, religious dogma held that man and woman were united into "one
flesh" by the solemnization of the marriage vow.
Note, Public Policy, The Courts andAntenputialAgreements Specifying Alimony, 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 113, 113 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. Not only was the wife unable to make contracts after the marriage, but also
the contracts she had made with her husband before the marriage were vitiated by the
marriage. Id See also Comment, Family Law-Volid v. Volid, Reconsideration ofthe
Role of the Antenuptial Agreement In Illinois, 4 Loy. CHI. L.J. 497, 498-99 (1973).
30. Subrin, supra note 2, at 54.
31. Id.
32. The avowed purpose and need of the agreement usually resulted from the
situation where the prospective husband, an elderly widower, owning realty and
other property, and having children by his first marriage, wanted the companion-
ship of a wife, usually a widow, in the twilight years of his life, but was reluctant
to pay too dearly for the bliss which, according to the inexorable accuracy of the
mortality tables, might prove of short duration.
[The jointure gave the wife] some security in the event of her husband's death,
even though it was something less than the law would give her.
Subrin, supra note 2, at 54. See Note, supra note 28, at 113.
33. See Note, supra note 28, at 114. See also Subrin, supra note 2, at 54.
34. See Note, supra note 28, at 114.
35. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband& Wife § 17 (1968). Statutes or constitu-
tional provisions removing the common law restictions can be found in most American
jurisdictions. Id. In Ohio, see OHIo Rav. CODE AN. §k3103.04, .07 (Page 1972) (prop-
erty ownership); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (Page 1972) (ability to make contracts
and incur obligations); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (Page 1954) (ability to sue and be
sued in her own name).
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Folger.36 An antenuptial contract between the decedent and his
wife was held to bar the wife's claim for dower. The court recog-
nized the validity of such contracts, relying upon English and
American authority approving them.37  These agreements were
approved because courts believed that the contracts promoted
harmony within the marriage by removing disputes about prop-
erty.38 Antenuptial contracts were upheld if they were entered in
good faith, with full disclosure of their consequences, and if they
included reasonable provision for the wife.39  The Stilley court
stated the permissible scope of antenuptial contracts in broad
terms:
[A]lmost any bonafide and reasonable agreement, made before
marriage, to secure the wife in the enjoyment either of her own
separate property, or a portion of that of her husband, whether
during the coverture or after his death, will be carried into exe-
cution .... Though, for many purposes, by the marriage, the
legal existence of the wife is merged in that of her husband, the
law [in this context] recognizes her legal and separate identity
and her separate rights; and she may preserve the one and en-
force the other, in contracts of this character.
40
The reasoning of the court reveals a desire to do equity. The
antenuptial contract at issue in Stilley did not conform to the tech-
nical terms of a jointure, which was the only means of defeating
dower under the Ohio statute in force in 1846.4.' Yet the court
held that the contract was a bar to dower. It reasoned that the
technical failure of the antenuptial contract to constitute a legally
cognizable jointure was not fatal; the antenuptial contract could
be given force as an equitable jointure, or alternatively, the agree-
ment could operate as a complete equitable estoppel to a claim for
dower.42
Today the Ohio statute governing the bar to dower does not
speak of jointure.43  The present statute is a legislative adoption
of the Stilley holding, recognizing the validity of antenuptial con-
36. 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
37. For reference to the specific cases cited by counsel, see Brief for Respondents, id.
at 624-46.
38. Id. at 649.
39. Id. at 647.
40. Id at 649.
41. The statute provided. "If any estate shall be conveyed to a woman as jointure, to
take effect immediately after the death of her husband, and to continue during her life,
such conveyance shall bar her right to dower." SWANS STATUTES, 296, § 2 (1824).
42. 14 Ohio at 650.
43. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2103.03 (Page 1976) provides in pertinent part: "The
conveyance of an estate or interest in real property in lieu of dower to take effect on the
10451978]
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tracts as an absolute bar to dower. The modem judicial approach
to antenuptial contracts also follows the Stilley rationale. 44
2. Classffication of Antenuptial Contracts
Antenuptial contracts lend themselves to several systems of
classification. They can be classified according to the considera-
tion received, the rights to which the instrument speaks, or the
contingencies contemplated by the parties.
a. Consideration. A valid antenuptial contract is based on
quidpro quo consideration.45 The consideration supporting the re-
linquishment of rights by one spouse in favor of the other can be
settled at the time the contract is entered,46 or it can be executory,
to be settled upon the happening of a future event, usually
death.47
b. Rights. Antenuptial contracts are commonly divided into
classes according to what rights the agreemeht addresses: conjugal
rights or marital property rights .41 Conjugal rights are the funda-
mental rights or duties incident to the marital relation, including
support, services, love, affection, and sexual relations.49  Marital
property rights are personal rights in property which arise by vir-
tue of the marriage, including dower,5" the statutory share of the
death of the grantor, will bar such grantee's right to dower in the real property of the
grantor."
44. Compare text accompanying notes 36-42 with Osborn v. Osborn, 10 Ohio Misc.
171, 226 N.E.2d 814 (C.P.Cuy. County 1966), affd, 18 Ohio St. 2d 144, 248 N.E.2d 191
(1969).
45. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
46. 13 OHIO PRACTICi § 1767 (1975). Such contracts are usually referred to as mar-
riage settlements. For reference to a typical contract form providing for the payment of
consideration to the relinquishing spouse at the time of the execution of the contract, see 1
OHIO FAMILY LAW Form 80, at 667-68 (Anderson 1975).
47. 13 OHIO PRACTICE § 1767 (1975). This type of agreement is the one most often
employed. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 54; Comment, supra note 29, at 498. For refer-
ence to a typical contract form providing for the payment of consideration to the relin-
quishing spouse at the death of his spouse, see 1 OHIO FAMILY LAw Form 81, at 668-70
(Anderson 1975). For a discussion of agreements contingent upon events other than death,
see notes 60-63 infra and accompanying text.
48. See 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 16, at § 90 (1964); Note, supra note 28, at 115; Note,
Unander v. Unander Recognition of the Alimony Provision in Antenuptial Contracts, 10
WILLAMETTE L.J. 117, 118 (1973).
49. See 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 16, § 90, at 90-57 (1964). In Ohio such rights are
statutorily defined. See OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 3103.01 (Page 1972), providing that
"h]usband and wife contract towards each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity,
and support."
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.02 (Page 1976).
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spouse's estate,51 the widow's allowance,52 homestead rights,5 3 and
other intestacy rights.5 4  As a general rule, courts favor antenup-
tial contracts involving marital property rights55 and disfavor an-
tenuptial contracts that concern conjugal rights. 6
There are two kinds of conjugal rights: rights which arise dur-
ing a continuing relationship (e.g., rights to sexual relations) and
rights which arise upon termination of the marital relationship
(e.g., alimony or property settlement rights). Contracts speaking
to rights arising during a continuing marital relationship have
been uniformly disdained by the courts as contrary to public pol-
icy.5 7  There is a conflict of authority regarding the validity of
contracts addressing alimony or property settlement rights. Tra-
ditionally, they were held invalid as contrary to public policy on
the theory that they tended to encourage divorce.58 A growing
number of courts have questioned the validity of the premise that
antenuptial contracts concerning certain conjugal rights en-
courage divorce and have applied the contrary-to-public-policy
51. Id. § 2107.39.
52. Id. § 2117.20. See also Troha v. Sneller, 108 Ohio App. 153, 151 N.E.2d 595
(Cuy. County P. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 169 Ohio St. 530, 159 N.E.2d 899 (1959); see generally
Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 858 (1970).
53. These include the right to reside in the mansion house, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2117.24 (Page 1976), and the right to purchase the mansion house and its contents, id.
§ 2113.32.
54. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.06 (Page 1976). See also Troha v. Sneller, 108
Ohio App. 153, 151 N.E.2d 595 (Cuy. County P. Ct. 1958), affd, 169 Ohio St. 530, 159
N.E.2d 89 (1959). But see Gionfriddo v. Palatrone, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 158, 196 N.E.2d 162
(Cuy. County P. Ct. 1964).
55. See Del Vechio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Stilley v. Folger, 14
Ohio 610 (1846); Comment, supra note 29, at 1135-36; Note, supra note 28, at 115; Note,
supra note 48, at 118.
56. 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband and Wfe § 322 (1968).
57. See note 63 infra.
58. Englund v. Englund, 286 Minn. 227, 175 N.W.2d 461 (1970); Motley v. Motley,
255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594,385 S.W.2d 288
(1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942
(1958); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931); 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 16, § 90, at 90-27 (1964); J.
MURRAY, JR., supra note 16, § 341, 722-24 (2d rev. ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 584, 586, 587 (1932). Under this traditional view, a couple entering marriage
("until death do we part") could not effectuate an antenuptial agreement which contem-
plated a future divorce. The public policy in favor of marriage as the cornerstone of a
stable society, see note 16 supra, as well as the state's interest in avoiding the burden of
supporting the divorced spouse, see Note, The Validity of Antenuptial Agreements Which
Limit the Property Rights of the Parties, Particularly as They Pertain to Divorce, 31 B.U.L.
REv. 92, 92 (1951), dictate this result. In Ohio the duty of support is statutory, thus em-
phasizing the state's interest in protecting itself against the burden of supporting wards.
OHIO REv. CODE AlN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1976) (the husband has a duty to support his
family, and if he cannot, the wife has a duty to contribute to assist him).
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rule less vigorously.59
c. Contingencies. It has been suggested that if prior to mar-
riage two individuals reflected on the incidents of the marital rela-
tion and decided to govern their relationship by contract,
"undoubtedly their concern will focus primarily upon two contin-
gencies-divorce and death."6  A few courts will recognize the
validity of an antenuptial contract that contemplates either of
these two contingencies. 61 Most courts, however, will not recog-
nize the validity of an antenuptial contract containing provisions
which contemplate divorce.6z Thus, under the majority rule, if an
antenuptial contract is found to contemplate a future divorce or if
it otherwise undermines the stability of the marital relation, it will
invariably be voided under the contrary-to-public-policy rule.63
B. Formation
The Ohio rule governing the validity of antenuptial contracts
is deceptively simple: an antenuptial contract fair and reasonable
in its terms and fully executed by both parties will be given effect
unless it is invalidated by fraud or is otherwise against public pol-
icy.' 4 Although this rule appears to be straightforward, the courts
59. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ii. App. 3d 386, 286
N.E.2d 42 (1972); Unander v. Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). See notes
23-24 supra and accompanying text.
60. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 692, 693 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 503 F.2d
1397 (2d Cir. 1974); Pamiawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (Super. Ct.
1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ii. App. 3d 83, 320
N.E.2d 506 (1974); Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Buettner
v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960);
Unander v. Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). 1
62. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); Motley v.
Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385
S.W.2d 288 (1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950). See generally
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (Supp. 1976); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS §§ 584, 586, 587 (1932).
63. See Gamble, supra note 60, at 704:
This rule, applied more vigorously by earlier decisions, is as follows, 'any ante-
nuptial bargain that looks toward, provides for, facilitates, or tends to induce a
separation or divorce after marriage, is contrary to public policy and void.' Ap-
parently this rule began as a rebuttable presumption. Now, however, the rule
seems to have become an absolute one which is applied to any antenuptial agree-
ment contingent upon divorce. This public policy rule is used regularly as a basis
for voiding an antenuptial contract contingent upon divorce, with total disregard
for whether or not the agreement actually encourages divorce. (footnotes omit-
ted).
64. Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938).
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT
have encountered difficulties defining what is fair and reason-
able,65 what is fully executed,66 and what contractual provisions
are against public policy.67 The thesis of this Note is that the
interpretive problems encountered in the law of antenuptial con-
tracts are rooted in the approach the courts have taken toward
these agreements. The courts have employed both rigid legal
rules and elastic equitable doctrines.68  Because the courts use
such an approach, it is necessary to examine both the legal requi-
sites and the equitable considerations governing the formation of
a valid antenuptial contract.
1. Legal Requisites
Since an antenuptial contract is made in consideration of mar-
riage,69 it comes squarely within the Statute of Frauds and must
therefore be in writing.70 Nevertheless, an oral contract reduced
to writing after the marriage ceremony has been held a sufficient
memorandum of the antenuptial bargain to remove it from the
strict requirements of the statute.'
Certain terms within antenuptial contracts will not be enforced
by the courts. "[I]f the contract contains provisions repugnant to
public policy the law will withhold its blessing. 72 Thus a court
will not enforce a provision in an antenuptial contract providing
that the children born of the marriage must attend a certain reli-
gious school and be reared according to a certain faith;73 such dis-
putes are more properly settled within the family, without state
65. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.
66. See notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
67. See text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
68. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
70. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page 1976). One court has intimated that par-
tial performance may take the contract outside the statute. Henry v. Henry, 27 Ohio St.
121 (1875).
71. SeeIn re Estate of weber, 170 Ohio St. 567, 167 N.E.2d 98 (1960). Such a memo-
randum must refer to the antenuptial contract, recite its terms, and otherwise affirmatively
show that it is a memorandum of the oral contract. Id. at 574, 167 N.E.2d at 102-03.
Weber also held that a memorandum of an antenuptial contract executed between married
individuals did not constitute a contract between a husband and wife aimed at altering
their legal relations; such contracts are prohibited by Ohio law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1335.06 (Page 1976).
72. Subrin, Some PracticalAspects of-AntenuptialAgreements Under the Laws of Ohio,
18 U. CIN. L. REv. 53, 56 (1949).
73. Hackett v. Hackett, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 245, 146 N.E.2d 477 (C.P. Lucas County 1957),
af'd, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 485, 150 N.E.2d 431, appeal dismissedfor want of debatable questions,
168 Ohio St. 373, 154 N.E.2d 820 (1958).
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intervention. Nor will a court enforce an antenuptial contract
purporting to preserve the right of the wife to bring a negligence
action against her husband after marriage.74 In addition, con-
tracts made for the sole purpose of legitimating a child75 or those
which provide that the married couple shall live apart upon their
separate assets76 have been declared void as against public policy.
An antenuptial contract, like any other contract, must be sup-
ported by adequate consideration.77 Ohio courts have held that
the consideration necessary to support an antenuptial contract is
of a dual nature. Consideration consists of (1) each party's prom-
ise to perform his marital obligations and (2) the mutual promises
that one party will convey a satisfaction in return for the other
party's promise to relinquish some or all of his rights in the other's
estate.78 In this regard, antenuptial contracts typically recite that
they are made "in consideration of the marriage" the parties are
about to enter,79 thereby emphasizing the reciprocal nature of the
parties' obligations. If the promisor's obligation is not supported
by recital of or an apparent provision for consideration in the an-
tenuptial contract, the absence of such a provision renders the
contract unenforceable.8 0
2. Equitable Considerations
The traditional, astigmatic view of men and women 8' pervades
the equitable considerations employed by Ohio courts to deter-
mine the validity of antenuptial contracts. Though an enforce-
able antenuptial contract may contain terms favoring a husband,
82
the close scrutiny applied to all antenuptial contracts is bottomed
on the fear that such agreements would be used by a strong, domi-
74. Subrin, supra note 72, at 56-57 (citing Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E.2d
813 (Cuy. County 1946)).
75. Id (citing Smith v. Smith, 154 Ga. 702, 115 S.E. 73 (1922)).
76. Id at 56.
77. Rippner, Marriage is a Damnably Serious Business-Especially the Second Time
Around, 40 OHIo BAR 291, 294-95 (1967).
78. See Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74
N.E.2d 67 (1947); Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); Dearbaugh v.
Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio
App. 399 (1919); Cantor v. Cantor, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 174 N.E.2d 304 (Mont. County P.
Ct. 1959); Ross v. Ross, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 181 (C.P. Ross County 1859).
79. See 1 OHIo FAMILY LAW Form 80, at 667-68; Form 81, at 668-70 (Anderson
1975).
80. See Conley v. Conley, 45 Ohio App. 2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 430 (Ham. County 1975).
81. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
82. Ross v. Ross, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 181 (C.P. Ross County 1859).
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nating husband to impose upon a weak, submissive wife. The
following statement from the century-old decision of Stilley v. Pol-
ger8 3 was incorporated into an Ohio decision reported in 1966:
[When that contract is intended to affect the rights which
spring from the relation of husband and wife, does not public
policy require that it shall be conducted with the utmost candor
and good faith?
"What person is so exposed to imposition as a woman, con-
tracting, personally, with her intended husband, just on the eve
of marriage, at a time when all prudential considerations are
likely to be merged in a confiding attachment, or suppressed
from an honorable instinct and sentiment of delicacy."
Surely, "it would be a reproach to the law, if the very vir-
tues and graces of woman were thus allowed to become the suc-
cessful means of overreaching and defrauding them in
bargains."8
4
In the modem context, the sentiments expressed in Stilley should
have no place in the construction of antenuptial agreements. It
has been urged that antenuptial contracts actually serve to allay
the fears of prospective spouses concerning economic exploita-
tion.8 5 Yet the Stilley dictum may, in combination with other
factors, 6 deter the use of a useful and beneficial tool.
In reviewing the equities of the contract, the courts in Ohio
presently focus on three considerations: the good faith of the par-
ties, 87 the full and fair disclosure of the value of the estate in
which a party is relinquishing rights,8 8 and the granting of fair
and reasonable consideration to the relinquishing party.89 Good
faith must attend these contracts because an engagement to marry
creates a confidential relationship of trust between the parties;90
the parties are not dealing at arm's length when they execute the
83. 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
84. Osborn v. Osborn, 10 Ohio Misc. 171, 178, 226 N.E.2d 814, 819 (C.P. Cuy. County
1966) (quoting Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 648), affd, 18 Ohio St. 2d 144, 248 N.E.2d
191 (1969).
85. See King & Firestone, Antenuptial Contract:A Usefullternative, 4 SAN FERN. V.
L. REV. 249, 250-51 (1975):
Marriage contracts have erased some of these [financial] fears and have per-
mitted some people, who might otherwise have remained single, to feel suffi-
ciently confident to marry. Such contracts may facilitate marriage by alleviating
fears of loss and exploitation which might have added to the stress of the marital
relationship. The removal of these fears through a marriage contract then per-
mits uncluttered attention to nurturing the marriage.
86. See notes 114-51 infra and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Mettler v. Warner, 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 363 (C.P. Huron County 1910).
88. See, ag., Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 264, 16 N.E.2d at 331. See also Pniewski v. Przybysz, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 385,
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contract.91 The requirement of good faith creates a duty in the
party in whose estate the other party surrenders rights to give a
full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent, and value of the es-
tate.9 z The legal effects of the contract must also be made known
to the party relinquishing rights.93
The value of the property granted the relinquishing spouse
must be a fair and reasonable amount, not out of proportion to the
value of the grantor's estate. The Ohio courts consider several
factors in determining the fairness of a settlement; the amount the
relinquishing party would have received at law,94 the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction,95 the relative ages of the par-
ties, the amount conveyed to the relinquishing spouse, the number
of children the parties have by former marriages, and the size of
the grantor's estate when the contract was executed. 96  If, how-
ever, a spouse entered the contract with full awareness of the ex-
tent of the grantor's property and an understanding of the
contract's terms, the court will not invalidate the contract because
the settlement is disproportionate.97
II. ENFORCEMENT OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
Historically, the purpose of an antenuptial contract was to bar
the rights of a surviving spouse which arose by operation of law at
the death of the other spouse.98 The promise to relinquish rights
was supported by consideration99 exchanged upon the execution
of the contract'0° or vesting upon the death of the spouse in whose
estate rights were being relinquished.' 0 ' Ideally, the antenuptial
387-88, 183 N.E.2d 437, 438 (Ct. App. Cuy. County 1962); Stotler v. Stotler, 19 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 369, 371 (C.P. Preble County 1916).
91. Stotler v. Stotler, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 369, 371 (C.P. Preble County 1916).
92. Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938). A general
knowledge of the purported wealth of the spouse in whose estate rights are being relin-
quished does not satisfy the requirement of a full and fair disclosure. See Duttenhoffer v.
Duttenhoffer, 12 Ohio Dec. 736 (Cin. Super. Ct. 1902).
93. The legal maxim that "one is constructively presumed to know the law" is inappli-
cable to cases involving antenuptial contracts. Mosier v. Mosier, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 268,
273-74, 133 N.E.2d 202, 207 (Frank. County P. Ct. 1954).
94. Id. at 274, 133 N.E.2d at 208 (citing Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264, 16
N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938)).
95. See Subrin, supra note 72, at 59.
96. Id. at 60. See also Rippner, supra note 77, at 299 (Table A).
97. Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331-32 (1938).
98. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 46 supra.
101. See note 47 supra. Divorce may unexpectedly affect the enforceability of the
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contract was satisfactory to all parties interested in the marriage.
The deceased spouse had enjoyed companionship, ensured that
his estate would pass without diminution, and had provided a fair
and reasonable settlement to his wife. The surviving spouse like-
wise had a companion and came away from the relationship with
a settlement to which the parties had voluntarily assented in good
faith. The state benefited because two citizens had remained in a
stable marriage relationship. Upon the death of one party, the
antenuptial contract eased the state's burden of supporting the
surviving spouse. Problems concerning the validity and opera-
tion of the contract arose, however, when the parties to the ante-
nuptial agreement subsequently divorced.
A. General Requisites for Enforcement
An antenuptial contract intended to take effect at the death of
one of the parties will be given effect if, after executing the con-
tract, the parties consummate the marriage and one party subse-
quently dies.'02 The effectiveness of the contract is dependent
upon full performance of the provisions in favor of the party relin-
quishing rights." 3 If the contract is designed to bar dower in con-
antenuptial contract. While courts "may refuse to enforce the executory portion of the
contract ... [they] are reluctant to disturb a prior transfer." 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at 90-72 (rev. ed. 1964).
Ohio has no reported cases addressing the issue whether a party giving consideration to
the other may recover it after the divorce. Where consideration has passed, antenuptial
agreements will not be rescinded on divorce. In Jackson v. Jackson, 222 Ill. 46,78 N.E. 19
(1906), the court held that a man who had conveyed real property to his prospective spouse
in consideration of the impending marriage could not reclaim it upon divorce. The court
reasoned that the marriage was part of the consideration for the transfer. Since the wife
had performed that part of the contract, a court in equity would not decree rescission. "[A]
court of equity will not ordinarily decree rescission of a contract where there is only a
partial failure of consideration . . . [e]specially . . . where the party against whom the
rescission is sought cannot be placed in statu quo." Id. at 48-49, 78 N.E. at 20. The
determinative fact was that the husband "cannot restore the [wife] to the unmarried state in
which he found her at the time he conveyed title to her." Id at 49, 78 N.E. at 20; accord,
Johnston v. Johnston, 182 Iowa 481, 166 N.W. 65 (1918); Sparrow v. Sparrow, 172 Minn.
91, 214 N.W. 791 (1927).
All is not lost for the party who has vested some gain in his ex-spouse prior to a divorce.
In Ohio, alimony is determined by the separate and relative assets of both parties, not just
those of the husband. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B)(9), (10) (Page Supp. 1976).
This approach to alimony mitigates the financial impact a prior transfer may have had on
one of the parties.
102. See Troha v. Sneller, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 74, 151 N.E.2d 595 (Cuy. County P. Ct.
1958), affd, 169 Ohio St. 397, 159 N.E.2d 899 (1959).
103. See Lowe v. Phillips, 14 Ohio St. 308, 315 (1863); Whistler v. Allward, 57 Ohio
App. 147, 149-50, 12 N.E.2d 299, 300 (Han. County 1936); Cantor v. Cantor, 15 Ohio Op.
2d 148, 152-55, 174 N.E.2d 304, 310-13 (Mont. County P. Ct. 1959).
10531978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [.
sideration of a stated satisfaction, payment of the specified
amount is an express condition precedent to enforcement of the
bar.1" In addition, courts have read an implied condition prece-
dent into antenuptial contracts requiring that the party seeking to
enforce the contract must have performed or attempted to perform
the spousal obligations incident to the marriage until the death of
the other spouse. 05
B. The Validity of an Antenuptial Contract Subsequent to a
Divorce
The weight of authority holds that "a marriage settlement,
valid in its formation and not fraudulently induced, is not abro-
gated by the divorce of the parties for marital misconduct arising
after the marriage, unless the language of the contract contains an
express provision against such conduct."1 °6  The courts have
promulgated sound reasoning in support of this rule. In Crise v.
Smith,"°7 the court concluded that certain rights arise incident to
the marriage and other rights arise independent of the marriage.
The court held that "all contractual or property rights of either
spouse, not arising out of and dependent upon the continuance of
the marriage status, survive the divorce. . . , and fall within the
scope and operation of the rules and principles governing similar
contractual or property rights."10 8  The court explicitly framed its
holding in the form of a general rule:
[A] divorce ... ends all rights of either spouse dependent on
marriage, and not actually vested, as curtesy, dower, and the
property rights under statutes of distribution, but as a rule
transfers of property and contracts executed before divorce are
not affected by dissolution of the marital tie.10 9
Other courts rest their decisions on the strict construction of
104. 57 Ohio App. at 149-50, 12 N.E.2d at 300.
105. See, e.g., Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74
N.E.2d 67 (1947).
106. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 101, § 90, at 90-72 (emphasis added). See also Din-
gledine v. Dingledine, 258 Ark. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189 (1975); Sandborn v. Sandborn, 3 Cal.
2d 437, 39 P.2d 830 (1935); Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934); Crise v.
Smith, 150 Md. 322, 133 A. 110 (1926); Sims v. Sims, 186 Neb. 780, 186 N.W.2d 491 (1971);
In re Cavazza's Estate, 169 Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 82 A.2d 331 (1951).
107. 150 Md. 322, 133 A. 110 (1926).
108. Id. at 327, 133 A. at 112.
109. Id at 326, 133 A. at 111. Cf. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.10 (Page Supp. 1976)
(all rights that accrue by virtue of the marriage terminate upon divorce).
1054 [Vol. 28:1040
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT
the antenuptial contract,"' holding that the agreement is gov-
erned by the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of
the instrument. One court stated that "[i]n the absence of fraud
or concealment, antenuptial agreements are valid and enforcible
[sic] and it seems to us that the only question in this case is con-
struction of the written contract."'I In construing the contract
the court held that "[i]f the husband failed to insert clauses to pro-
tect his estate in the event of. .. divorce. . . , the courts cannot
rewrite the contract for his benefit. The contract here was free
from all ambiguities. . . .The agreement was absolute.""' 2 The
court said that it was not persuaded by the "speculations" of other
jurisdictions that "one of the considerations for such agreements is
...the marriage relation."' 13
In contrast to the foregoing approach, Ohio adheres to the
view that continued performance of marital obligations is part of
the consideration that supports the contract. 14  Under this ap-
proach, the lack of an express provision terminating the contract if
the parties divorce does not prevent the courts from refusing to
enforce its terms.' 5
Ohio's first reported case considering the validity of an ante-
nuptial contract subsequent to a divorce, Kennedy v. Kennedy,116
indicated that Ohio would adhere to what has been termed "the
weight of authority":" 7 the contract would be enforceable unless
it contained an express clause for termination upon divorce.
In Kennedy, a wife had been awarded a divorce and alimony
due to the husband's gross neglect of duty. The husband brought
suit maintaining that the award of alimony was in error because
an antenuptial contract executed between the parties barred such
an award. The contract provided that the husband would "care
for and support [the wife] out of his income so long as they should
be husband and wife . . ,,.18 It further provided that "if for
110. Sims v. Sims, 186 Neb. 780, 186 N.W.2d 491 (1971); In re Cavazza's Estate, 169
Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 82 A.2d 331 (1951).
111. In re Cavazza's Estate, 169 Pa. Super. Ct. at 246-47, 82 A.2d at 332.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 248, 82 A.2d at 332.
114. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74
N.E.2d 67 (1947).
116. 11 Ohio App. 399 (Cuy. County 1919).
117. 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 101, § 90, at 90-72. Seealso Annot., 47 A.L.R. 473, 474
(1927).
118. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio App. 399, 400 (Cuy. County 1919).
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any reason the parties should separate and not live together as
husband and wife" the wife was to have no interest in the hus-
band's property acquired before the marriage. 19 After eighteen
months of marriage the parties separated. The trial court con-
cluded that the husband had grossly neglected his duty to his wife,
thus breaching both the marital relation and the antenuptial con-
tract; hence the court awarded both a divorce and alimony to the
wife. The court of appeals held that "[i]f the contract has not
been substantially performed by the husband, then the wife ought
not to be barred by such contract of the right to alimony given to
her by the statutes of the state."' 20
The Kennedy decision rests on a strict construction of the con-
tract. The court did not question the validity of the contract but
addressed only the issue of enforcement. Since the party seeking
enforcement was in breach of the contract's terms, the court would
not enforce the contract in his favor. It is manifest that this ap-
proach is simple, predictable, and fair. The parties adopted an
agreement evidencing their intentions and expectations. If one
party wishes to enforce the contract he must have fully performed
it.
It is regrettable that the Ohio courts have not followed the
Kennedy approach. Rather, the courts look beyond the face of
the instrument purportedly in search of the intent of the parties.' 2 '
Interestingly, the courts have always discovered that the parties
intended the validity of the contract to turn upon the continued
existence of the marriage relation.' 2 In practice, the search for
intent has become nothing more than a summary conclusion,
without a considered discussion of the actual terms of the parties'
agreement. 2 3  This mechanical approach to antenuptial con-
tracts-a de facto presumption that the parties intended some-
thing not evident on the face of their contract--denies the parties
the power to write their own agreement and restricts the useful-
ness of antenuptial contracts.2 a
119. Id. at 401.
120. Id. at 401-02.
121. See Southern Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74
N.E.2d 67 (1947).
122. Id See also Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262
(Shelby County 1959).
123. See, e.g., Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (Shelby
County 1959).
124. "The importance of legally enforceable promises can hardly be over-estimated
.... The social order rests upon stability, and predictability of conduct, of which keeping
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The roots of the present approach can be traced to Southern
Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart 12 5 the first Ohio
Supreme Court decision concerning the enforceability of an ante-
nuptial contract after the parties to it had divorced. In Burkhart
the court, making no reference to Kennedy, erroneously stated that
the issue was one of first impression in Ohio. In a brief, 3-page
declaratory judgment on the enforceability of the contract, the
court did not reproduce the terms of the agreement. The sole ref-
erence to the antenuptial contract was that
[i]t contained a statement that [the husband] had made a will
providing for a payment of $300 per month to [the wife] as long
as she should live. The contract provided also that she should
be paid from his estate the further sum of $1,000 per year for
five years. These provisions were in consideration of the re-
marriage.
1 26
The parties had married, divorced, and later remarried. Prior to
each marriage they executed an antenuptial contract. Thirteen
years after the second marriage, the husband was. awarded a di-
vorce due to the wife's aggression. Two years later, on the death
of her ex-spouse, the woman sought to enforce the terms of the
contract. The executor of the husband's estate sought a declara-
tory judgment that the agreement was void for failure of consider-
ation. The court held for the executor.
In thq. instant case the rights the wife agreed to relinquish were
those of a surviving spouse. But at the time her former hus-
band died she was not his wife, and hence had no rights as a
surviving spouse to relinquish in consideration for the sums she
now claims from his estate. Under the terms of the antenuptial
contract it was contemplated that she should remain his wife
and perform the marriage obligations of a wife as long as he
and she lived. This she failed and refused to do. . .and she
cannot in sound reason and good conscience require perform-
ance of a contract which she herself has failed and refused to
perform.127
promises is a large item." J. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 2 (1970).
See also Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692, 728-29 (1972):
Judges in the area of antenuptial contracts have found themselves caught in
the dilemma of providing contractual freedom on the one hand and, on the other
hand, protecting the state against the support of unwanted wards ....
The rules used to solve this dilemma must have clarity and predictability
.... The present guidelines presented in the decisions involving antenuptial
contracts are uncertain and unpredictable .... The prevailing sense of uncer-
tainty suggests that the increased use of antenuptial contracts has been in spite of,
rather than due to, the applicable rules governing them.
125. 148 Ohio St. 149, 74 N.E.2d 67 (1947).
126. Id. at 149, 74 N.E.2d at 67.
127. Id. at 152-53, 74 N.E.2d at 68-69.
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Burkhart is troublesome for at least two reasons. First, the
court did not once refer to the text of the contract to support its
conclusion. 28 Second, the court established a rule far exceeding
the precedent upon which it relied. The court depended heavily
on an Iowa case, York v. Ferner,129 which, in turn, had relied
upon an earlier Iowa case, Jacobs v. Jacobs.30
In Jacobs, the antenuptial agreement provided, in part, that
each party was to remain secure in his separate property brought
to the marriage and that the wife was to be barred of dower. Af-
ter eight years of marriage, the wife left the husband and refused
to return. Upon the husband's death, the wife sought dower.
The court held that the antenuptial contract barred her claim:
It is claimed . . . that the contract is . . .without sufficient
consideration, and, therefore, ought not in a court of equity to
be enforced. We cannot so regard it. The law always looks
upon marriage as a civil contract .... So far as it appears, the
contract was freely and voluntarily entered into, without any
fraud or imposition .... [T]he advantages are about equal,
and the contract is fair and reasonable. We know of no reason
why it should not be enforced.13 '
Jacobs stands in contrast with York, where the antenuptial
contract was not enforced. In York, the couple had been married
for only fifty-two days when the wife left the husband because of
his notorious and frequent drunkenness. Notwithstanding the
husband's condition, the court determined that the wife had no
cause to leave him; she "took him for better or for worse." With
this premise, the court examined the validity of the antenuptial
contract with the view that the person claiming under it "did...
desert and abandon [her husband] without cause."' 32  The court
concluded that:
The antenuptial contract was based upon the contemplated
marriage whereby plaintiff became bound to discharge the du-
ties of a wife .. . .The consideration of the instrument is the
marriage contract; if it be broken and violated, the antenuptial
contract cannot be enforced. It would be monstrous to hold
128. Though the court asserted that "under the terms of the antenuptial contract it was
contemplated that she should remain his wife...," id. at 152, 74 N.E.2d at 68, the opinion
gives no clue as to what language in the parties' contract reveals this intent. Naturally, the
broad rule laid down in Burkhart, not anchored to the specific contractual provisions the
court was purportedly construing, was bound to be problematic. See notes 142-51 infra
and accompanying text.
129. 59 Iowa 487, 13 N.W. 630 (1882).
130. 41 Iowa 600 (1876).
131. Id. at 607.
132. 59 Iowa at 188, 13 N.W. at 631.
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that a woman could collect an annuity settled upon her by a
contract in contemplation of marriage, when after the marriage,
without cause, she utterly refused to live with her husband
longer than seven weeks and three days. This is the precise
case before us. Our conclusions, [that the claim be dismissed],
we think, are supported by legal principles and sound rea-
son. 133
In both Jacobs and York, the parties executed antenuptial
contracts, married, and thereafter the wife ceased performing her
marital duties by leaving her husband. Yet in Jacobs the antenup-
tial contract was enforced to bar the wife of dower, while in York
the antenuptial contract was not enforced to settle upon the wife
an annuity. In both cases the decision was against the wife, the
apparently guilty party. In so holding, however, these courts
failed to expressly define useful rules for construing antenuptial
contracts. Unfortunately, by relying on these decisions, Burkhart
itself failed to articulate useful standards.
134
The Burkhart decision relied on three additional out-of-state
decisions. Becker v. Becker'35 was simply inapposite; there, one
party failed to perform an express covenant in the antenuptial
contract. Both Veeder v. Veeder136 and New Jersey Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co. v. Parker137 held that the party seeking to enforce
the antenuptial agreement had to prove full performance of all of
the express covenants in the contract and either full performance
of his marital obligations until the death of the other spouse or full
performance of his marital obligations until the other spouse pre-
vented further performance.
The court in Parker looked to the terms of the antenuptial
133. 59 Iowa at 491, 13 N.W. at 632 (citing Jacobs v. Jacobs, 41 Iowa 600 (1876)).
134. The York court relied on Jacobs to assert that its holding was supported by legal
principles and sound reason. The ground of distinction, and the source of support, must
lie in the length of time that the parties had lived together-eight years in Jacobs and fifty-
two days in York.
If the Burkhart court had relied solely on Jacobs and York, the Burkhart result would
likely have been different. In Burkhart the couple had been married thirteen
years-certainly, on the facts, bringing it closer to Jacobs than to York. However, it is
probable that the Burkhart court never read Jacobs, but merely cited to it in borrowing the
quote from York that had cited to Jacobs. In this light, the Burkhart decision is under-
standable. Yet the ultimate result of the Burkhart court's reliance on York is thaLthe
distinction between York and Jacobs--the length of the performance of the marital du-
ties-was submerged.
135. 241 l. 423, 89 N.E. 737 (1909).
136. 195 Iowa 587, 192 N.W. 409 (1923).
137. 85 NJ. Eq. 557, 96 A. 574 (1916).
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contract to fred the intent of the parties1 38 and construed the terms
strictly. Because the wife had failed to show that she had in good
faith performed her marital obligations, she was unable to enforce
the contract. 139 The court in Feeder did not scrutinize the ante-
nuptial contract but instead adopted the Parker holding for the
proposition that a spouse must show full performance of his mari-
tal obligations to enforce the contract. 4 ° Burkhart echoed the
Feeder holding and adopted its approach. Thus, instead of em-
ploying the rigorous and thoughtful analysis of Parker, focusing
upon the actual terms of the contract, the Burkhart court summa-
rily disposed of the parties' agreement.'
41
In spite of the problems inherent in the Burkhart decision, its
holding and its approach have been perpetuated in subsequent
Ohio decisions. The next reported Ohio case on the enforceabil-
ity of an antenuptial contract after a divorce was Dearbaugh v.
Dearbaugh, 42  decided twelve years after Burkhart. In
Dearbaugh, the wife had been granted a divorce from her hus-
band on the ground of extreme cruelty, and alimony had been
awarded. The husband brought suit contending that an antenup-
tial contract between the parties barred an alimony award. The
court, quoting from Burkhart and the precedent upon which
Burkhart relied, held for the wife. "The consideration of the in-
strument [the antenuptial agreement] is the marriage contract, if it
be broken and violated, the antenuptial contract can not be en-
forced."' 143 The Dearbaugh court, by strictly adhering to Burk-
hart, in turn adopted the problems inherent in Burkhart. The
court did not refer to the terms of the contract it was constru-
ing-in fact, the parties failed to include it in the record on ap-
peal-and the court affirmed the use of a rule that exceeded the
authority upon which it was based. By not referring to the terms
of the contract it was construing, the court did not rest its decision
on the parties' intent, as the Burkhart decision had purported to
do. Rather, the court in Dearbaugh transformed a rule of con-
138. Id. at 561, 96 A. at 576.
139. Id. at 563, 96 A. at 577. The contract provided that the wife would be entitled to
one-third of the husband's income "in event that she should keep her promise to become
[his] wife." Id. at 561, 96 A. at 576. This was construed by the court as an express condi-
tion requiring the wife to perform her marital duties before she could enforce the contract.
140. Veeder v. Veeder, 195 Iowa 587, 595-96, 192 N.W. 409, 412.
141. 148 Ohio St. at 152, 74 N.E.2d at 68.
142. 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (Shelby County 1959).
143. Id. at 542, 170 N.E.2d at 263 (quoting Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. at 151, 74 N.E.2d at
68 (quoting York, 59 Iowa at 491, 13 N.W. at 632)).
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struction allegedly rooted in intent into a mechanical rule that
could be applied to render a contract unenforceable without refer-
ence to the intent of the parties who made the instrument. 44
The latest statement of the rule regarding the enforceability of
an antenuptial contract subsequent to a divorce appeared as dic-
tum in Conley v. Conley.'45  The court held that the absence of a
recital of consideration in an antenuptial contract rendered the
agreement unenforceable. The agreement provided for support
payments payable by the husband to the wife but did not recite a
reciprocal duty for the wife toward the husband. After the parties
divorced,' 46 the husband ceased making support payments. The
wife then sued for specific performance of the contract. Although
the court denied specific performance based on the lack of consid-
eration, it stated:
In addition... the document might be deemed unenforceable
where the writing itself reasonably reveals the intent of the par-
ties that the duty to perform [the contract] is conditioned upon
the continued legal existence of the marriage.., and where the
termination of that marriage by divorce removes the condition,
relieving both parties of any further duty to perform.147
Thus, albeit only by way of dictum, the rule promulgated by the
Conley court can be stated thus: when the court can perceive that
the parties intended the contract to be valid only so long as the
marriage continued, the agreement becomes unenforceable by
both parties upon termination of the marriage. This interpreta-
tion, like those in .Burkhart and Dearbaugh, is troublesome. The
Ohio cases are devoid of examples of language within antenuptial
contracts evidencing the intent referred to in Conley. Further,
Conley indicates that upon termination of the marriage the con-
tract may be unenforceable by either party-a principle not sup-
ported by prior Ohio authority.148
144. The court indicated that a breach of an express promise made in the antenuptial
contract was not the sole ground for granting relief to the non-defaulting party. Id at 542,
170 N.E.2d at 264. The court thus opened the door to unbridled judicial intervention in
the private arrangements of the parties regardless of how they have chosen to write their
agreement.
145. 45 Ohio App. 2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 430 (Ham. County 1975).
146. The ground for the divorce was not revealed in the opinion.
147. Conley v. Conley, 45 Ohio App. 2d 1, 3, 340 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ham. County 1975)
(emphasis added).
148. Prior to Conley, the decisions focused upon the enforceability of an antenuptial
contract subsequent to a divorce in favor of the party that failed to perform either an
express or implied term of the contract. Southern Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burk-
hart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74 N.E.2d 67 (1947); Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540,
170 N.E.2d 262 (Shelby County 1959); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio App. 399 (Cuy.
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In sum, as the Ohio courts were confronted with antenuptial
contracts that contained no express provision for termination in
case of divorce, they had to either enforce the contract after the
divorce or find some way to render it unenforceable. The courts
chose the latter path, notwithstanding the fact that the parties
could have inserted clauses in their contracts to protect their re-
spective estates in the event of a subsequent divorce. 149 Thus, the
Ohio courts have forsaken strict construction of the contract in
favor of a purported search for the intent of the parties. Since the
decisions reveal no clue as to what language evidences the parties'
intent, the cases serve as a poor foundation for predicting judicial
reaction to antenuptial contracts. The absence of guidelines for
finding intent in antenuptial contracts undermines the desirability
of adhering to an approach which purportedly enforces antenup-
tial contracts according to the intent of the parties. A broader
rule striking down all antenuptial contracts subsequent to a di-
vorce is fraught with inequities.' 50  Since the essential function of
formalizing a relationship by contract is to assure stability and
predictability through fulfillment of expectation,' 5' it is desirable
County 1919). No Ohio court had gone so far as to say that both parties were barred from
enforcing the agreement subsequent to a divorce.
149. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajf'd, 503 F.2d
1397 (2d Cir. 1974). "The antenuptial agreement . . . included a provision that 'upon
condition that [plaintiff] survive [defendant] and upon further condition that at the time of
[defendant's] death the said parties have not been divorced or separated by decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction, or separated by written agreement . Id. at 62 (em-
phasis omitted).
The antenuptial contract in Conley contained the following clause: "'In the event of a
mutual or legal separation or of separate maintenance. . . . I also agree to pay you (Mary
Ann) $50.00 per week beginning with the first weekly payday after the date of separation.
I agree to continue payments until changed by mutual or legal agreement.' [sic]." 45 Ohio
App. 2d at 4 n.2, 340 N.E.2d at 433 n.2.
150. The inequity of utilizing a blanket rule based solely upon performance of the mar-
ital obligations until death is apparent in the following examples:
i) Prospective spouses A and B execute an antenuptial contract, marry, and live
together one year. B dies. Under he blanket rule, A gets the settlement under
the contract. ii) Prospective spouses C and D execute an antenuptial contract,
marry, and live together ten years. D then divorces C. One year later D dies. C
cannot enforce their antenuptial contract under the blanket rule.
151. See general iJ. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 3 n.4 and accom-
panying text (2d rev. ed. 1974); see also Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 130,42 N.W.2d 500,
503 (1950) (dissenting opinion):
Public policy, of course, favors marriage and is concerned with its stability. I
think it must be conceded that, in other relationships, contracts defining the ex-
pectations and responsibilities of the contracting parties promote stability. If
they are desirable in other human activities there should be, at least, no presump-
tion that they tend to promote discord in marriage. And even in marriage any-
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that the courts adopt an approach aimed at furthering, rather than
defeating, the intent of the contracting parties.
III. PROPOSALS AND CONSIDERATIONS
"Its [the law's] principles or rules or concepts are not always
finalities. They may mark what is only a stage of progress, or
at times a stage of retrogression. Even so, their implications
are something more than vanities. They are to be heeded like
the laws of nature till superseded by another formulation more
truthful in its expression of the order of the juristic uni-
verse."
1 52
It is plain that the state has an interest in providing its citizens,
prior to marriage, with a tool by which they can determine their
relative property rights as spouses.1 53 "If the policy is to allow
parties to antenuptially determine property rights, then there must
be rules that will facilitate and guide premarital planning.1154 At
the same time, it is widely recognized that the state has a special
interest in preserving the marital relation. 55 The courts must
adopt rules relating to antenuptial contracts that maximize the
parties' contractual freedom156 without simultaneously undermin-
ing the state's interest in societal stability and self-supporting citi-
zenry. 157 These rules must reflect modem social attitudes toward
male-female roles, marriage, death, and divorce. 58 In any event,
one can think of possible problems which it is well to be agreed upon before the
ceremony.
Accord, Volid v. Volid, 6 M11. App.3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972).
152. B. LEvy, CARDOZO AND FRONTiERS OF LEGAL THINKING 56 (rev. ed. 1969) (quot-
ing B. Cardozo, Address, 55 REP. N.Y.S.B.A. 284). See also Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352
N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). "Judicial decisions traditionally assimilate the mores of
society. If they did not, the law would tend toward repression and unresponsiveness to the
realities of human conditions." Id. at 789.
153. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
154. Gamble, supra note 124, at 729.
155. See note 16 supra.
156. See note 15 supra.
157. Gamble, supra note 124, at 728. Compare note 16 supra with text accompanying
note 178 infra.
158. Compare the following:
There can be no doubt that the institution of marriage is the foundation of the
familial and social structure of our Nation and, as such, continues to be of vital
interest to the State; but we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the concept of
the "sanctity" of a marriage-as being practically indissoluble, once entered
into-held by our ancestors only a few generations ago, has been greatly eroded
in the last several decades. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the
ratio of marriages to divorces has reached a disturbing rate in many states; and
that a new concept of divorce-in which there is no "guilty" party-is being ad-
vocated by many groups and has been adopted by the State of California ....
With divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that many
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a viable solution requires a revamping of the courts' assumptions
and legal precepts in both the formation of antenuptial contracts
and the enforcement of such contracts.
A. Proposal
A revision of Ohio's approach to antenuptial contracts must
begin with and be guided by considerations that "insure that the
spouses knowingly enter into the contractual relationship."'' 59
Therefore, there is merit to the existing precedent requiring full
and fair disclosure of the nature and extent of the estates of the
prospective spouses. 160  Moreover, though the following proposal
is aimed at bringing the rules relating to antenuptial contracts in
closer alignment with those of contracts generally, it does not pur-
port to apply to prospective spouses principles geared toward
commercial dealings: "there is a vast difference between a con-
tract made in the marketplace and one relating to the institution
of marriage." 16'
The proposal is two-pronged. First, the courts should establish
a presumption that the parties have bargained at arm's length if
each was represented by independent counsel upon the execution
of the contract; 162 this would infuse the law of antenuptial con-
prospective marriage partners... might want to consider and discuss also-and
agree upon, if possible-the disposition of their property and the alimony rights
of the wife in the event their marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail.
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
In view of the relatively equal status of women to men under the law, as it is
now evolving, married couples should not be deprived of the right by contract to
divide their property as they please ....
While there is validity to the Madison Avenue pronouncement that "you've
come a long way, baby," it is equally true that the former complete protective role
of the court regarding alimony is no longer necessary in light of social changes.
Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (Super. Ct. 1976).
When the rules regarding the husband's duty of support were first enunciated,
the roles of a husband and wife were more rigid and defined. The husband
worked and brought income into the family while the wife maintained and man-
aged the household. The woman generally did not seek outside employment
partly, because "her place was in the home", and partly because few opportunities
for meaningful employment were available. Married women nowadays are in-
creasingly developing career skills and successfully entering the employment mar-
ket. Where a woman is trained, healthy, and employable, and where a woman's
efforts have not contributed to her husband's wealth or earning potential, the
necessity for an alimony award upon the breakup of the marriage is not great.
Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46-47 (1972).
159. Gamble, supra note 124, at 729.
160. See notes 92 & 93 supra and accompanying text.
161. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970).
162. The proposal for a presumption of arm's length bargaining has been suggested
previously by other commentators. See Gamble, supra note 124, at 733-34; Note, Public
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tracts with the general law of contracts.'63 If one of the parties to
the contract proves that he was not represented by independent
counsel at the time of execution-a rather light burden-the pre-
sumption would be rebutted. The court would then pursue the
second prong of the analysis by carefully examining the actual
bargaining position of the parties. This approach avoids the
problematic anachronism which presently governs the formation
of antenuptial contracts-the "confidential relationship."'' 64
Stated simply, the first part of the proposal is a presumption of
arm's length bargaining; the second part of the proposal applies in
the event the presumption is rebutted and requires the adoption of
rules which realistically reflect the modern prenuptial relation-
ship.
Several benefits flow from the presumption of arm's length
bargaining where the parties are represented by counsel. The
presence of counsel curbs deception, assures fair disclosure and
negotiation of a fair and adequate settlement, and educates the
Policy, the Courts, andAntenuptialAgreements SpeciyingAlimony, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 113,
131 (1970). Cf. Note, Unander v. Unander: Recognition ofthe Alimony Provision in Ante-
nuptial Contracts, 10 WILLAMETrE L.J. 117, 122-23 (1973) (recognizing that the rationale
for sustaining the validity of alimony provisions can be supported upon recognition of
arm's-length bargaining between the two parties).
163. In other words, the courts should recognize a greater "freedom of parties to settle
their rights in good faith as they see fit .... This would result in judicial deference to the
fair and reasonable provisions made by the parties in the assumption that they were in the
best positions to determine property distribution and alimony payments." Note, Unander
v. Unander. Recognition ofthe Alimony Provision in Antenuptial Contracts, 10 wILLAMETTE
L.J. 117, 122-23 (1973).
164. See, e.g., Pniewski v. Przybysz, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 387, 183 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ct.
App. Cuy. County 1962):
It is generally true that persons engaged to marry do stand in a confidential rela-
tionship towards each other. Antenuptial agreements are carefully scrutinized by
the courts, particularly as to the question of full disclosure as to the nature and
extent of the property of each. However, this duty is generally placed upon the
prospective husband by the law which also requires that the prospective wife
clearly understand the contract that is being entered into ....
However,. . . there is no reciprocal duty on the part of the prospective wife
toward the prospective husband ....
It certainly follows as a natural corollary that if there is no absolute duty on
the part of a prospective wife to disclose the nature and extent of her property,
especially in a marriage of convenience between mature adults, consequently,
there is no absolute requirement in the law that the prospective husband know
and comprehend exactly the contents of an antenuptial agreement. [citations
omitted].
In Pniewski the husband was elderly, did not understand the agreement, and was not rep-
resented by independent counsel when the agreement was executed. The contract was
held to be a valid bar to survivorship rights in his wife's estate.
See generally notes 90 & 91 supra and accompanying text; see also Gamble, supra note
124, at 720-23.
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parties concerning the legal rights and duties which flow from the
marriage relationship. 65 Perhaps most important, the presump-
tion fosters predictability in the enforcement of antenuptial con-
tracts.' 66 The courts can defer to the contractual provisions on
the presumption that the presence of counsel assured a true reflec-
tion in the agreement of the parties' intent. This would displace
the present interventionism of Ohio courts in their purported
search for the intent of the parties.
167
Moreover, the requirement of independent counsel would
probably not discourage prospective spouses from employing the
antenuptial contract. Most spouses who have executed antenup-
tial contracts in the past have been married previously,168 are gen-
erally of middle age or older,1 69 have dealt with attorneys before,
and would in any event seek the advice of an attorney in drafting
an antenuptial agreement.' 70 Hence, the requirement of counsel
is not an additional burden on the parties who typically employ
antenuptial contracts. Rather, it recognizes actual practice in the
formation of the agreement.
The mechanics of the proposal are simple. In construing an
antenuptial contract, the court will examine the face of the docu-
ment to determine if it complies with governing legal principles. "71
If so, the presumption arises that the parties had full knowledge of
the nature of the agreement they were executing, the nature and
extent of the estate in which rights were being relinquished, and
that disclosure was made truthfully and in good faith. On its
face, the contract settlement should be presumptively fair, ade-
quate, and not disproportionate. To rebut the presumption the
contesting party need only prove that he was not represented by
independent counsel at the execution of the contract. To facili-
tate the proof of the presence of counsel a simple tactic would be
to have each party's attorney subscribe to the contract. Alterna-
tively, the contestant could depose the party resisting the action.
Other options are the use of a notary or attestation witnesses.
165. See Note, Public Policy, The Courts, and Antenuptial Agreements Specifying Ali-
mony, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 113, 131 (1973).
166. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 114-51 supra and accompanying text.
168. See Gamble, supra note 124, at 733; Note, supra note 165, at 131.
169. Id.
170. See Note, supra note 165, at 131.
171. See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
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Upon rebuttal, the court is faced with four questions: (1) did
the parties know the nature of the agreement they were entering;
(2) did the relinquishing party know the extent of the estate in
which he was relinquishing rights; (3) did the party in whose es-
tate rights were being relinquished make a truthful disclosure in
good faith; and (4) is the settlement fair and reasonable? 72  The
approach employed by the courts in considering these questions is
critical to the outcome of litigation of these contracts. The pres-
ent approach, rooted in the notion of the "confidential relation-
ship,"' 173 must be abandoned in favor of an approach that focuses
on the actual bargaining position of the parties. In practice the
proposed approach would require the court to make a determina-
tion of the relative bargaining powers by reference to all the sur-
rounding circumstances, including the ages of the parties,
financial experience, and the purpose of the marriage. Under the
proposal, the courts ultimately lose some power to strike down
antenuptial contracts by abandoning the traditional focus and
adopting a test focused on actual bargaining strength. The latter
approach will afford the courts less latitude to find constructive
conditions in the contracts. Also, the adoption of rules realistically
reflecting modem prenuptial relationships will curb arbitrary ju-
dicial imposition of legal principles based on outmoded social
premises.' 4 The courts will, however, retain the "power to refuse
to enforce a particular antenuptial contract if it is found that it is
unconscionable, obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, mate-
rial nondisclosure or duress."'' 75  In this manner the proposal
achieves and guarantees equity.
172. Cf. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962) (tests for uphold-
ing an antenuptial contract).
173. See notes 90 & 91 supra and accompanying text. The stereotypical presumption
that the man holds the superior bargaining position is reflected in the evidentiary rule that
the husband must meet a more stringent standard of proof than would his wife in challeng-
ing the validity of an antenuptial contract. See Pniewski v. Przybysz, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 385,
183 N.E.2d 437 (Ct. App. Cuy. County 1962).
For a general discussion of these inequities, see Gamble, supra note 124, at 723-26:
[I]t is suggested that there is an important conclusion to be drawn from the fact
that few husbands contest the antenuptial contract. This hesitation of husbands
to contest the contract may be due, not to virtue and respect for deceased wives,
but to the courts placing a greater burden of proof upon the contesting husband
than upon the wife.
174. See note 152 supra.
175. Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45-46, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973).
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B. Developments
Several jurisdictions have begun to redefine the role of ante-
nuptial contracts in divorce proceedings' 76 in two interrelated
contexts. First, there is a growing body of authority upholding
the enforceability of antenuptial agreements stipulating the dispo-
sition of alimony rights. Second, there is a trend toward employ-
ing antenuptial agreements to determine the equities of alimony
and property division where the agreement is wholly or partly un-
enforceable. These are issues which the courts of Ohio must one
day confront. 177
1. Enforcement of Antenuptial Contracts Which Settle the
Alimony and Property Rights of the Parties Upon
Divorce
Traditionally, antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce
have been invalidated on two public policy grounds: (1) such con-
tracts are contrary to the state's interest in preserving the marriage
relationship, because they "provide for, facilitate or tend to induce
a separation or divorce,"1 7  and (2) the state has an interest in
assuring that the husband adequately meet his support obligation,
so that the divorced wife need not seek public assistance. 179
Recently, a number of decisions have reexamined the founda-
tion of the public policy rules and have upheld contracts contem-
plating a future divorce or separation if their terms are fair and
reasonable. 80 Several considerations have prompted the courts
to abandon the old rule: the practical difficulty of determining
when such a contract invites, promotes, or encourages divorce;"'
the absence of empirical evidence that such agreements actually
encourage divorce or separation;182 and the erosion of the concept
176. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 6 II. App.
3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); Unander v.
Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973); Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 133
N.W.2d 820 (1965).
177. There are no reported cases in Ohio on these issues as of the date of this writing.
178. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 390, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972).
179. Id See note 61 supra.
180. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383-85 (Fla. 1970); Unander v.
Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 105-07, 506 P.2d 719, 720-21 (1973).
181. Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 42, 505 P.2d 600, 602 (1973).
182. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ili. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972). See also Note,
supra note 165.
[T]he modem view holds that divorce is merely legal recognition of marital
breakdown, which may be caused by combinations of many factors. One com-
mentator notes that in general "the increasing frequency of marriage failure is
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that marriage is an indissoluble relationship.1 83
Moreover, the current legislative trend in favor of "no fault"
divorce reflects a state policy that "marriage between spouses who
'can't get along' is not worth preserving."'18 4  One court reasoned
that it was anomalous to permit prospective spouses to waive
dower in an antenuptial agreement and yet forbid them from
planning upon an agreed support arrangement in the event of a
future divorce.185
Such cases indicate that courts will no longer hold contracts
contemplating divorce void from their inception as contrary to
public policy,1 6 but instead will examine the terms of each con-
tract on a case-by-case basis and uphold the agreement if its terms
are fair and reasonable. 8 7 Antenuptial contracts have been up-
held where they provided for a release from all claims for alimony
and property in consideration for a lump-sum payment. 88 In
other cases, courts have enforced contracts providing that neither
party would seek alimony nor claim any of the separate property
of the other in the event of a divorce.' 89 In examining these con-
tracts the courts generally focus on whether the parties "entered
into the antenuptial contract fairly, freely, understandingly and
without fraud, that its provisions were reasonable and that said
contract was valid."' 190 In determining the reasonableness of the
support terms of antenuptial contracts contemplating divorce, it is
likely that the courts will refer to the same factors that govern the
rooted in the tensions of modem living, in the desperate search for individual
happiness, and the highly differentiated American Culture." To hold that ali-
mony provisions in antenuptial agreements cause divorce in all cases oversimpli-
fies the complex nature of marriage breakdown. While an alimony provision
could contribute to marital breakdown in some instances, in other situations it
may be entirely irrelevant.
Id at 117 (footnotes omitted).
183. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
184. Unander v. Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 105, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
185. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972). "It may be...
cogently argued that a contract which defimes the expectations and responsibilities of the
parties promotes ... marital stability." Id. at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46.
186. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970).
187. Compare id with Eule v. Eule, 24 Ili. App. 3d 83, 87-88, 320 N.E.2d 506, 510
(1974).
188. See, e.g., Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Buettner v.
Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 506 P.2d 719
(1973).
189. See e.g., Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (Super. Ct.
1976); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
190. Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d at 597.
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adequacy of alimony awards.' 9 ' In practical terms this means
that the courts will examine the circumstances of the parties at the
time of divorce to determine their relative needs and abilities.
Therefore, upon a showing that a spouse's circumstances have ma-
terially changed so that the amount agreed upon is inappropriate
at the time of the divorce, the court will not enforce the contract's
provision for alimony. 192  This is particularly significant because
it is likely-except in marriages of short duration-that the agree-
ment will not provide adequate support for one of the parties.
2. Use of Antenuptial Contracts to Determine the Equitable
Division of Property in Divorce Proceedings
There have been no Ohio decisions addressing the possible use
of antenuptlial agreements to determine property settlement' 93 in
divorce proceedings. However, Ohio courts can find guidance in
the law of several other jurisdictions which have confronted the
issue.194 The issue concerning the use of antenuptial contracts to
determine the equities in a divorce proceeding has arisen in three
contexts. In a jurisdiction where the courts strike down antenup-
tial contracts contemplating divorce under the contrary-to-public-
policy rule, the antenuptial contract has been used to determine
the value of the separate assets of the parties before marriage 95
191. See, e.g., Unander v. Unander, 265 Ore. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973):
"[A]ntenuptial agreements concerning alimony should be enforced unless enforcement de-
prives a spouse of support that he or she cannot otherwise secure. A provision providing
that no alimony shall be paid will be enforced unless the spouse has no other reasonable
source of support." (footnotes omitted). AccordEule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 320
N.E.2d 506, 510 (1974).
192. Unander v. Una q der, 265 Ore. 102, 107-08, 506 P.2d 719, 721-22 (1973). A re-
lated issue is modification of alimony granted pursuant to the terms of an antenuptial
agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. Courts reaching the issue in dicta indicate
that such decrees would be as susceptible to modification as would any other alimony
decrees. Id; accord, Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1970) (concurring opin-
ion).
193. Alimony is to be distinguished from a division of the property. The distinc-
tion may be more technical than real in Ohio practice. A division of property is
returning to each spouse that which is his and determining what interest each has
in property that was acquired through joint contribution and effort. A division is
an ascertainment of ownership. Alimony is the payment from the property of
one spouse to the other to discharge a duty owed.
OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, IV Siandardrfor Alimony
Determination, I(B)(5), at 4.01 (1974).
194. See, e.g., Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1976); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Kunde v. Kunde, 52 Wis.2d
559, 191 N.W.2d 41 (1971); Strandberg v. Strandberg, 33 Wis.2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349
(1967); Werlein v. Werlein, 27 Wis. 2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820 (1965).
195. See Kunde v. Kunde, 52 Wis. 2d 559, 560, 191 N.W.2d 41, 41 (1971); Strandberg
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In a jurisdiction which does not adhere to the contrary-to-public-
policy rule, an antenuptial contract held invalid on other grounds
has been used as evidence of the surrounding circumstances rele-
vant in allocating the property rights of the parties. 196 In a juris-
diction which does not adhere to the contrary-to-public-policy
rule, courts have divided assets between the parties according to
the terms of a valid antenuptial contract. 1
97
Apparently, the value of an antenuptial contract in a divorce
proceeding depends not on the rules pertaining to the enforcement
of such contracts but rather on the rules pertaining to awards of
alimony and property settlements. Recent developments in the
law regarding alimony awards and property settlements portend
substantial benefit from the use of antenuptial contracts in divorce
proceedings.
At common law, the husband was responsible for the full and
unrelieved support of his wife. Alimony developed as a statu-
tory substitute for the marital right of support. Court interpre-
tation required the husband to support and maintain his wife in
accordance with his means and their standard of living, regard-
less of the wife's separate property and resources. This has
been modified to permit an examination of various mediating
factors such as the wife's assets and income .... 198
Under Ohio law, alimony may be granted to either spouse. 199 In
1974, the Ohio General Assembly amended the alimony law,
enumerating eleven criteria to be followed by the courts in calcu-
lating the postmarital support obligation.2 °" The statutory lan-
v. Strandberg, 33 Wis. 2d 204, 207, 147 N.W.2d 349, 351 (1967); Werlein v. Werlein, 27
Wis. 2d 237, 241, 133 N.W.2d 820, 822-23 (1965).
196. Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 89-90, 320 N.E.2d 506, 511-12 (1974).
197. Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 349, 354, 551 P.2d 323, 327, 331, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 3, 7, 13 (1976).
198. Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and PropertyAwards, 43 U. CIN. L. REv.
133, 140 (1974).
199. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1977).
200. Section 3105.18 provides:
(A) In a divorce, dissolution of marriage, or alimony proceedings, the court
of common pleas may allow alimony as it deems reasonable to either party.
The alimony may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by de-
creeing a sum of money, payable either in gross or by installments, as the court
deems equitable.
(B) In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the na-
ture, amount, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all the
relevant factors, including:
(1) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(2) The ages, and the physical and emotional conditions of the parties;
(3) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties;
(5) The duration of the marriage;
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guage is neutral; it refers to the "party," "spouse," or "parties"
and does not distinguish between the husband or wife. This re-
flects the Ohio view that alimony should be awarded to either
party based on need."°1 "The amount of alimony to be allowed in
any given case rests in the sound discretion of the court. The
amount awarded is to be determined by the financial and physical
condition of the parties and their needs at the time of the hearing
of the action for alimony. 20 2
Regardless of whether Ohio courts will uphold the validity of
antenuptial agreements containing terms governing the disposi-
tion of property in the event of divorce, the agreements may be
used to determine the equities in a divorce proceeding. This
would be fully consistent with the policy upon which the Ohio
alimony statute is grounded.2 0 3  "The theory. . . is that the re-
turn of individual property plus the division of marital property
will meet the needs of the parties. If that doesn't meet the needs,
then, and only then, is there resort to maintenance (alimony).' 2 4
The antenuptial contract, through either explicit recital of the sep-
arate property of one or both of the parties2 5 or through infer-
ence,20 6 discloses the separate assets which the parties brought into
(6) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he
will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside
the home;
(7) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(8) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(9) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(10) The property brought to the marriage by either party;
(11) The contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.
201. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 414, 350 N.E.2d 413, 423 (1976);
Hasselschwert v. Hasselschwert, 103 Ohio App. 202, 207-08, 145 N.E.2d 224, 229 (Def.
County 1956); Weikert v. Weikert, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 585, 136 N.E.2d 159 (Ct. App. Champ.
County 1955).
202. Hasselschwert v. Hasselschwert, 103 Ohio App. 202, 207-08, 145 N.E.2d 224, 228
(Def. County 1956). See also 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACTS § 15, at 15-77 (rev. ed. 1976); Note, The Economics of Divorce. Alimony and
Property.4wards, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 133, 141 (1974).
203. The theory of § 3105.18, as well as the standards by which the determination of
alimony is made under that section, is similar to that of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (1970), reprinted in 5 FAM. L. Q. 205
(1971). See also OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, supra note 193, II(D), at 4.08-4.11.
204. OHIo LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, supra note 193, II(D)(3), at 4.09.
205. See, e.g., Eule v. Eule, 24 II. App. 3d 83, 85, 320 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1974) (assets of
both parties recited in the contract). After reference to the contract, the courts' sole task
would be dividing jointly-owned property.
206. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 352 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976);
Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 41, 505 P.2d 600, 601-02 (1973) (in both cases assets of
only one party were recited in the contract). In such cases the court could subtract the
separate property listed in the antenuptial contract from the aggregate assets of both parties
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the marriage and thereby provides evidence satisfying two statu-
tory criteria for determining an award: "The relative assets and
liabilities of the parties ...[and] [t]he property brought to the
marriage by either party."207 Thus, there appears to be no imped-
iment to this limited use of antenuptial contracts in determining
equitable property division and alimony in Ohio, even where the
courts refuse to enforce terms contemplating divorce.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Ohio antenuptial contracts have seldom been litigated.
When these agreements have been challenged, the courts have
strictly adhered to precedent. As a result, their analysis of ante-
nuptial contracts is grounded on traditional mores rather than
modem values. In their effort to do equity, the courts' ap-
proach-a purported search for the intent of the parties, without
explicit reference to the terms of the instrument-has resulted in a
prevailing sense of uncertainty concerning the rules surrounding
both formation and enforcement of such contracts.
Fundamental changes are occurring in society's perception of
the role of the female vis-a-vis the male, changing the concept of
marriage, marital roles, and divorce. This transformation has in-
creased the use of antenuptial. agreements and fueled litigation in-
volving them. Ohio's present approach to antenuptial contracts is
problematic and anachronistic. It should be abandoned in favor
of a new approach aimed at producing predictable results based
on modem values.
RANDOLPH CARL OPPENHEIMER
to determine the separate property of the party who did not list his assets in the agreement
and the joint property of the parties.
207. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (B)(9), (10) (Page Supp. 1976).
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